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I. INTRODUCTION
In October of 2013, California Governor Jerry Brown signed Assembly Bill
1
484 into law. This bill changed California’s standardized testing requirements
for students in kindergarten through twelfth grades, abolishing the Standardized
Testing and Reporting (STAR) program and replacing it with the Measurement
2
of Academic Performance and Progress program (MAPP). California
Superintendent of Public Instruction Tom Torlakson explained that the change
was the result of the lack of alignment between STAR and the recently adopted
“Common Core Standards”: the old exams assessed material that students are no
3
longer being taught. The shift was a result of a nationwide movement toward the
Common Core Standards motivated, in part, by President Obama’s Race to the
4
Top program.
AB 484 also authorized the Superintendent to temporarily postpone issuing
Academic Performance Index (API) scores for two years if the transition
compromises the utility of the scores in accurately comparing schools and
5
districts. API scores are calculated from many sources, including standardized
6
testing, and are used in California, along with other data, to determine whether
students are achieving the federally mandated Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP)
7
requirements. Without a valid API score it is impossible to determine whether
districts or schools are meeting AYP requirements, especially in kindergarten
through eighth grade, in which API scores are the primary measures in making
8
this determination.
Almost immediately, United States Secretary of Education Arne Duncan
criticized AB 484 because the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) mandates that
1. A.B. 484, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
2. Id.
3. See Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Educ., State School Chief Tom Torlakson Comments on Statement by
U.S. Secretary of Education Regarding AB 484 (Sep. 10, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Our
goals for 21st century learning, and the road ahead, are clear. We won’t reach them by continuing to look in the
rear-view mirror with outdated tests, no matter how it sits with officials in Washington.”).
4. See generally Tamar Lewin, Many States Adopt National Standards for Their Schools, N.Y.TIMES
(July 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/education/21standards.html?_r=0 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (describing the movement toward states adopting the Common Core Standards to
create some national consistency).
5. A.B. 484, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
6. See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2012–13 ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE INDEX REPORTS INFORMATION
GUIDE 6 (May 2013), available at http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/ac/ap/documents/infoguide13.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (using STAR scores to calculate API).
7. See CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2013 ADEQUATE YEARLY PROGRESS REPORT INFORMATION GUIDE, 5–6
(Aug. 2013), available at http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/ac/ap/documents/infoguide13.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (“Schools . . . and the state are determined to have met AYP if they meet or exceed
each year’s goals.”).
8. Id. at 6. AYP for high schools in California also rely on graduation rates and scores from the California
High School Exit Exam (CAHSEE), which is not affected by this bill. See id. at 5. See also A.B. 484, 2013
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
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states determine which schools and districts are meeting AYP requirements every
9
year and threatened to withhold federal education funding from the state. He
expressed concern that even a temporary halt in testing and AYP determinations
would compromise the integrity of the data necessary for the transparency and
10
accountability NCLB requires.
After six months of uncertainty, the Federal Department of Education
relented and granted a one-year waiver of some of the requirements of NCLB
and agreed to allow California’s amended testing plan to continue without
11
penalty. The approval came just over a week before California schoolchildren
12
were scheduled to participate in the revamped testing program.
This controversy exposes a fundamental problem with the manner in which
the federal government has influenced public education for the last half century.
Rather than claiming a specific federal interest in public education, Congress has
taken a piecemeal approach culminating in massive micromanagement without a
13
clearly articulated goal. This Comment will demonstrate that the federal threat
to withhold funding provided by Title I of NCLB for the temporary suspension of
standardized testing is a manifestation of the coercive nature and
unconstitutionality of NCLB, and will suggest an alternative model of federal
public education legislation.
In order to ease the tensions between the states and the federal government,
Congress should limit NCLB programs to those originally intended by its
14
lineage, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA).
Congress should then call for the creation of a basic floor of educational
outcomes for all children in the United States. These outcomes would serve as
constitutionally guaranteed minimum educational requirements, leaving
curriculum, instructional models, assessment, and accountability to individual
states, schools, and teachers. The Commerce and Due Process clauses of the
15
Constitution empower Congress to make these changes.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the history of the federal
government’s role in public education. Part III will demonstrate that the current
model, relying on Spending Clause jurisprudence, is unconstitutional under the
9. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Statement by U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan on
California Bill to Exempt Millions of Students from State Assessments (Sept. 9, 2013) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
10. Id.
11. Letter from Deborah S. Delisle, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Michael W. Kirst, President,
Cal. State Bd. of Educ. and Tom Torlakson, Superintendent of Pub. Educ. (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www2.ed.gov/
nclb/freedom/local/flexibility/waiverletters2009/caft3.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
12. Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Educ., State Schools Chief Tom Torlakson, State Board President Kirst
Issue Joint Statement on Federal Approval of California Testing Waiver (Mar. 7, 2014) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27.
15. See infra Part IV.
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current understanding of that clause. In Part IV, this Comment will propose an
alternative model that articulates and promotes the federal interest in public
education while allowing the states, districts, schools, and teachers to determine
how to best fulfill that interest.
II. HISTORY OF FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN EDUCATION
A brief overview of the trends in federal education policy from the founding
fathers to modern day provides some perspective on how contemporary federal
education law has developed and why the proposal called for in this Comment
would mark a major shift in perspective regarding the federal role in public
education.
A. States’ Rights and a Tradition of Federalism
It has long been understood that public education falls primarily under the
16
authority of state and local governments. While the founders clearly understood
17
the importance of an educated electorate to a functioning democracy, and there
is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that there was early advocacy for the
18
notion of public education, it was not until the early 19th century that “common
19
schools,” the precursors to our contemporary schools, arose and not until the
early 20th century that anything resembling the modern public education system
20
began to take form.
There is little mention of educational expectations, curriculum, or instruction
21
in federal discourse until well into the 20th century. The needs and priorities of
22
the states varied greatly, and the Constitution’s silence on public education
23
suggests the founders intended it to be a states’ rights issue.

16. JAMES RAPP, EDUCATION LAW, §3.01[1] (2014).
17. See id. §1.01[5][a] (quoting George Washington about the importance of education).
18. See id. (quoting a selection from George Washington’s 1796 farewell address).
19. Id. §1.01[2].
20. See id. §1.01[6][b] (describing the emergence of the “six-three-three” system of elementary, middle,
and high schools).
21. See id. § 3.01[1] (describing the rise of federal involvement in public education). The Federal
Government did earmark specific parcels in land grants for the purpose of public education, but did not give any
instruction on how public instruction should be delivered. Id. at § 101[5][b].
22. See generally id. § 1.01[2] (describing the functions early schooling served in various regions of the
country).
23. Id. § 3.01[1].
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B. 20th Century Developments
The middle of the 20th century brought two major developments that forced
24
the federal government’s hand in taking an active role in public education. The
1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education established that
25
segregated schools violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Two years later, following the Russian launch of Sputnik, lawmakers began
to consider the quality of education a national security issue and passed the
26
27
National Defense Education Act of 1958 (NDEA). NDEA used federal funds
to target programs in mathematics, sciences, engineering, and foreign languages
28
for the highest-achieving students.
The conflation of these two priorities set in place a fundamental policy
challenge that continues today: is it the role of the federal government to ensure
that states are rigorously challenging the brightest students or is it to ensure that
29
states are teaching all students equally?
C. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) was a
30
centerpiece of President Johnson’s “War on Poverty.” By far the most extensive
federal foray into public education to date, ESEA provided five distinct methods
31
of aid. The most significant provision was Title I, which provided funds to
32
improve the education of children in low-income families. Under Title I, school
districts are eligible for funding if 3% or at least 100 school-aged children in the
33
district come from low-income families. States provide this data to the
34
Department of Education which, in turn, fund the states. The monies then flow
to school districts based on a federally mandated formula that fund districts in

24. Id. § 1.01[6][a].
25. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
26. 20 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.
27. ADAM NELSON & ELLIOT WEINBAUM, N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP’T, FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY AND
THE STATES, 1945–2009: A BRIEF SYNOPSIS 11–12 (Nov. 2009 ed.) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
28. Id. at 12.
29. See infra Part II.E.
30. See generally NELSON & WEINBAUM, supra note 27 at 16–18 (discussing the educational policies of
President Johnson vis-a-vis his “War on Poverty” and the development of ESEA).
31. Id. at 17–18.
32. Id. Title II allocated funds for school libraries and instructional materials, Title III covered
supplementary educational centers and services, Title IV was earmarked for research into effective teaching
methods, and Title V gave money directly to State Departments of Education to help implement the other
provisions of the act. Id.
33. Carl L. LoPresti, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965: The Birth of Compensatory
Education, 1971 URB. L. ANN. 145, 148 (1971).
34. Id. at 149.
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35

proportion to the district’s number of low-income students. On the local level,
the funds are used to service children in “attendance areas” where at least 50%
36
families live in poverty. From the outset, some commentators noted that this
37
distribution is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. Children from poor
families who live in attendance areas that are not predominately impoverished do
not receive funds while children from wealthier families who happen to live in an
38
impoverished attendance area do receive the federal benefits.
D. The Reagan Revolution
For the first decade under ESEA, the federal funding model stayed about the
39
same. However, under subsequent reauthorizations, the number of federally40
funded programs increased dramatically. Under this model, known as
41
categorical funding, particular grants were earmarked for particular programs.
States and districts could get additional funding for specific student groups
including low-income, racial minority, non-native English speakers, or
42
43
handicapped children. The election of Ronald Reagan changed that model.
As part of their agenda to decrease the debt and diminish the size of the
central government, Reagan conservatives slashed funding to categorical
44
programs. Congress cut more than $1 billion in federal aid to schools and the
remaining funds changed from categorical programs into “block grant”
45
programs. Under this new funding structure, the federal government allocated
considerably less money to states and school districts, but removed restrictions
46
on how they could spend it. While allotments were calculated using similar
metrics as before, states were not required to spend the money for the specific
47
programs that targeted the students of highest need.
It was in the midst of this giant shift in federal education policy that Federal
Education Commissioner Terrel Bell released A Nation at Risk: The Imperative
48
for Educational Reform. This report painted a scathing picture of American
35. Id.
36. Id. at 160.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See generally NELSON & WEINBAUM, supra note 27 at 18–44 (detailing the progression of federal
education policy, primarily adding more categories of students for whom federal funds were being earmarked).
40. Id. at 36.
41. Id. at 28–29.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 45.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 46.
47. Id. at 47.
48. Id. at 49.
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schools, pointing out a precipitous drop in high school student’s SAT scores
49
since the late 1950’s. The report suggested that the federal government’s pursuit
50
of equity came at the expense of quality.
The Reagan administration responded quickly by calling for vague federal
goals like “excellence” and stressing that federal aid should only be given to
51
schools that can demonstrate this nebulous trait. In a harbinger of the
52
oxymoronic policies that would develop in the field of federal education law,
the report called for a “nationwide [but not federal] system of state and local
53
standardized tests.” The seeds had been planted for the next generation of
federal education policy—draconian, punitive measures imposed on states by
54
way of vague instructions and a complete lack of codified objectives.
E. No Child Left Behind
In 2001, the landscape once again shifted with the passage of NCLB. An
enormous federal program that promised excellence for all while threatening
underachieving schools was the highpoint of this conflation of the competing
55
goals of excellence and equality.
NCLB retained the designation of Title I schools that emerged under ESEA,
but while it provided them with substantially increased funding, it also saddled
56
them with a multitude of new requirements. NCLB compelled all states
receiving funds to administer standardized tests that assess students on
57
“challenging academic content and achievement standards.” It further required
58
states to adopt a metric of AYP that would compare the progress of schools.
States were required to institute penalties for schools that did not meet targets
and to ensure that all students in all schools would be “proficient” in the content
59
standards by 2014. If Title I schools did not meet their AYP targets, they faced
a series of federally mandated penalties that could include shutting down schools
60
or a state takeover of a district. NCLB deliberately did not define “challenging
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 48.
52. See infra Part II.E.
53. NELSON & WEINBAUM, supra note 27, at 49.
54. Id..
55. See Martin R. West and Paul E. Peterson, The Politics and Practice of Accountability, in NO CHILD
LEFT BEHIND? THE POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 1, 8 (Martin R. West and Paul E.
Peterson eds. 2003) (describing the twin aims of excellence and equality in terms of accountability).
56. LEARNING FIRST ALLIANCE, MAJOR CHANGES TO ESEA IN THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT 2
(2002) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id. at 6–7.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 8.
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academic content,” prescribe a specific annual test, or even define what AYP
61
meant. In an apparent nod to the notion of states’ rights, NCLB did not tell
states what to do—only the consequences of not doing it.
F. Contemporary Trends
NCLB has become an unpopular law with coalitions on all sides of the
62
political divide for various reasons. Conservatives feel it is a federal takeover
63
and too intrusive into the rights of states. Teachers’ unions note that in many
states, NCLB has created controversial policies that tie teacher salaries, or even
64
employment, to test scores. Many educators believe the notion that all students
would be able to demonstrate a high level of proficiency by 2014 was an
65
unattainable goal from the very beginning. NCLB was due for reauthorization in
66
2007, but that deadline has come and gone. Developing trends suggest a stark
partisan divide on reauthorization, but proposals from both parties lead the
federal law further astray from the original intention of ESEA.
President Obama’s “Blueprint for Reform” suggests amending NCLB further
by adding additional objectives, including improving teacher effectiveness,
providing information about schools to families, and implementing college and
67
career-ready standards and assessments.
In February of 2015, the House of Representatives postponed a vote on a
reauthorization bill sponsored by Representative John Kline, a Republican from
68
Minnesota. At one point this bill appeared poised to make it through that
chamber quite easily, but it subsequently came under fire by the most
69
conservative wing of the Republican Party. A significant force in stalling the
61. See generally id. at 2 (describing the new policies without mention of specific standards or practices).
62. See generally Jennifer Hochschild, Rethinking Accountability Politics, in NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND?
THE POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 107, 107–08 (Martin R. West and Paul E. Peterson
eds. 2003) (discussing the general unpopularity of NCLB).
63. Id. at 108.
64. Id. at 107.
65. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, REBECA JACOBSEN, & TAMARA WILDER, ‘PROFICIENCY FOR
ALL’ – AN OXYMORON 1 (2006), available at http://s4.epi.org/files/page/-/old/webfeatures/viewpoints/rothstein
_2006 1114.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing how the 100% proficiency by 2014 goal
established by NCLB is unattainable).
66. Barbara Michelman, The Never-Ending Story of ESA Reathorization, POLICY PRIORITIES (ASCD),
Spring 2012 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
67. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE ELEMENTARY
AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT (2010) available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/blueprint/blueprint.
pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
68. Alyson Klein, House Leaders Officially Postpone Vote on NCLB Rewrite, EDUCATION WEEK
(February 27, 2015), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2015/02/house_leaders_officially_postp.
html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
69. Alyson Klein, How a Conservative Blogger Helped Derail the House NCLB Rewrite, EDUCATION
WEEK (Mar. 5, 2015), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2015/03/how_a_conservative_blogger_
hel.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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bill came from an education blogger whose (factually incorrect) post claiming the
70
bill would require states to adopt the Common Core Standards “went viral.”
As of the time of this comment’s publication, the Senate appears to be close
71
to agreement on bipartisan overhaul of ESEA. It appears that this bill, in its
current state, would continue the current practice of requiring states to adopt
“challenging academic standards” with no federal oversight and, presumably,
72
little federal guidance.
III. THE CURRENT NCLB IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
This section will demonstrate that NCLB, and any similar subsequent
reauthorization under the Spending Clause, is unconstitutional. This argument
begins with a discussion regarding the articulation of coercion under National
73
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius and then applies that analysis to
NCLB.
A. Factors of Coercion
Under Article I, section 8.1 of the Constitution, Congress has the power to
spend money “for the general welfare” of the United States. Congress’ spending
74
programs must be optional, specific, limited in scope, and unambiguous. In
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Court struck down
the Medicaid expansion portion of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) by finding it
75
improperly coercive. While not establishing a bright-line rule, the Court
highlighted aspects of the new law that it considered in determining that the
76
Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional.
The ACA greatly expanded the number of individuals covered by Medicaid
77
and provided the federal funds to pay for their inclusion. States needed to agree
78
to accept the new standards of inclusion to receive any Medicaid funding. The
79
Court identified three factors that made the Medicaid expansion coercive.

70. Id.
71. Lauren Camera, Senate Education Leaders Close in on Bipartisan ESEA Rewrite, EDUCATION WEEK
(April 3, 2015), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2015/04/senate_education_leaders_close.html
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
72. Id.
73. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
74. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
75. 132 S. Ct. at 2608.
76. Id. at 2602–07.
77. Id. at 2606.
78. Id. at 2603.
79. Id. at 2606.
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First, the Court described the Medicaid expansion as “a shift in kind, not
80
merely degree.” In this analysis, the Court examined the intent of the original
81
Medicaid program and compared it to the program offered under the ACA. The
original program designated discrete categories of individuals that were deemed
82
especially needy. The expansion, on the other hand, provided healthcare for a
far greater number of people and was an element of a comprehensive universal
83
healthcare plan. The Court saw the enormity of the covered class in this change
of legislation as a fundamentally different program rather than an expansion of an
84
existing program.
Next, the Court considered whether states would have been able to anticipate
85
the transformation of the program when they initially agreed to accept funding.
86
Citing Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, the Court ruled that
attaching unforeseeable conditions to the acceptance of federal monies
87
constituted an abuse of the Spending Clause power given to Congress.
Finally, the Court discussed the amount of the funds the States had been
88
receiving from the program before the expansion. Distinguishing South Dakota
89
v. Dole, the Court reasoned that since Medicaid made up 20% of the average
State’s total budget, the threat to remove those funds was “much more than
90
‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”
The Court explicitly stated that its holding does not identify a specific brightline defining when a Spending Clause law becomes coercive; it merely indicates
91
that, in this case, it is “surely beyond it.”
B. Coercion in NCLB
Applying these factors to NCLB makes it clear that NCLB is also
92
unconstitutional as a coercive federal action.

80. Id. at 2605.
81. Id. at 2605–06.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2606.
84. Id. at 2605–06.
85. Id. at 2606.
86. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
87. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2606.
88. Id. at 2604–05.
89. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
90. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604.
91. Id. at 2606.
92. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals suggested this plausibility in Pontiac v. Duncan, 584 F.3d 253
(2009), but as it was never raised by the States, it has never been directly addressed.
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1. NCLB Was a New Program—A Shift in Kind, Not Degree
In Sebelius, the Court first considered whether the Medicaid expansion
93
replaced or amended existing law. The Court first dismissed the idea that since
the program was still called Medicaid, it must be a change of an existing program
94
rather than a new program. Instead, the Court viewed the distinction between
the intention of the original law and the intention of the new one as the
compelling characteristic determining whether it was a shift in kind or in
95
degree.
96
The purpose of ESEA was to fight poverty. Federal funds were intended “to
provide financial assistance . . . to local educational agencies serving areas with
concentrations of children from low-income families to expand and improve their
educational programs by various means . . . which contribute particularly to
97
meeting the special educational needs of educationally deprived children.” The
98
programs within ESEA are certainly aligned to this clearly delineated goal.
In contrast, NCLB’s defined purpose is “to ensure that all children have a
fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and
reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging State academic achievement
99
standards and state academic assessments.” The change in purpose here is
potentially even more extreme than it is in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. Not
only is the class of citizen greatly expanded (from low-income to everyone), the
focus of the purpose is shifted from a funding scheme to an oversight
100
mechanism. While the concern for low-income students may be implicit in the
NCLB’s statement of purpose, the intent of NCLB is vastly different than the
101
intent of the original ESEA.
One commentator suggests that this analysis is inappropriate because while
ACA implicitly created two programs (Medicaid expansion and “pre-existing
102
Medicaid) there is no such distinction under NCLB. In her dissent, Justice

93. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2605.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2605–06.
96. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1439.
100. Compare Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 27 (defining the purpose of the
act to provide money to schools with low-income students), with No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 115 Stat.
1439 (defining the purpose of the act to ensure quality education to everyone).
101. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 115 Stat. 1439.
102. Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of Federal Education
Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 619 (2013).
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103

Ginsburg drew this distinction, but the majority shot it down. The Court was
104
clear that Congress’ intent, not the label, controls this factor.
The change in purpose between the original ESEA and NCLB closely
mirrors the change in purpose of the Medicaid expansion proposals under ACA
and, consequently, NCLB should be seen as a “new program” under the analysis
in Sebelius.
2. NCLB was Unforeseeable
In Sebelius, the Court relied on the “clear-notice” requirement of the
105
Spending Clause articulated in Pennhurst. Under Pennhurst, Congress must
provide clear-notice of the conditions for funding at the time the state initially
106
claims funds under a given act. The Sebelius Court found it unlikely that a
state, upon initial acceptance of Medicaid funds, would have anticipated the
107
transformation of Medicaid under the ACA.
Applying that standard to NCLB, the question becomes whether state
education officials would have anticipated the requirements of state-wide testing
108
and standards under the original ESEA of 1965. The answer is no. On its face
the ESEA prohibited the federal government from “exercise[ing] any direction,
109
supervision, or control over the curriculum [or] program of instruction.”
Moreover, the “standards movement” and rise of standardized testing did not
110
even begin until the 1980s. It is unimaginable that state education officials
would have been able to predict, much less anticipate, the size and scope of
NCLB when they accepted ESEA funding in 1965.
3. NCLB is Dragooning State Legislatures
The size of a federal grant is very important in determining whether the
requirements to receive funding under a federal program amount to
111
commandeering state law or operating coercively. In one extreme, the Court
found that 5% of the funds from a particular highway grant was so low (less than
.5% of the state budget) that it was not coercive, but only “mild

103. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2635 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 2605.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2606.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 2606 (discussing the perspective from which to conduct a coercion analysis).
109. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27.
110. BENJAMIN MICHAEL SUPERFINE, THE COURTS AND STANDARDS-BASED EDUCATION REFORM 5
(2008).
111. Compare Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (deciding a grant was so large it must be coercive), with South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (finding a grant was so small it could not be considered coercive).
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encouragement.” In the other extreme, in Sebelius the Court ruled that 100% of
federal Medicaid funds, on average 20% of total state revenue, represented “a
113
gun to the head.” Unfortunately, the Court has not yet defined a bright-line rule
as to when encouragement turns to compulsion, but it is possible that the funding
levels in NCLB could meet this threshold.
Federal NCLB payments represent about 8.3% of K-12 education funding
114
(1.5% of the average state budget). Since the Court in Sebelius did not establish
a clear line dividing when a grant becomes large enough to be coercive, it is
unclear on which side of that line NCLB would fall. It is more than 300% of
115
“mild encouragement” but less than 8% of “a gun to the head.” Further
guidance into this matter may come from the fact that no state refused to take
116
money under NCLB. It is certainly feasible to suggest that 100% buy-in from
the states is an indicator that the size of the grant was large enough that the states
could not simply leave it behind. This would seem to indicate that NCLB might
have passed that line into coerciveness.
No doubt there will be discussion among commentators regarding the waiver
117
California received in response to the AB 484 controversy. Some are likely to
argue that the waiver process provides an escape clause for states so they can
avoid the dragooning effect of large Spending Clause enactments and reduce the
coercive nature of such federal programs. That argument fails to address the
gravity of the constitutional problem invoked by a coercive federal action. An
administrative remedy that may or may not be granted to a requesting state is
hardly sufficient to cure a major constitutional defect. Further, absent an
“intelligible principle” that articulates the criteria the Department of Education
uses in applying such waivers, there is a potential constitutional violation in that
118
delegation itself.
4. NCLB is Coercive
On balance, the factors delineated in Sebelius indicate that the structure of
NCLB should be considered coercive. There are strong indicators that NCLB is a
new program: a shift in kind rather than a shift in degree. It seems very unlikely

112. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
113. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (deciding a grant was so large it must be coercive).
114. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 10 FACTS ABOUT K–12 EDUCATION FUNDING 2 (June 2005), available at
http://www2.ed. gov/about/overview/fed/10facts/10facts.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
115. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (ruling that 20% of a state’s budget is “a gun to the head” and
distinguishing it from Dole which was less than one-half of one percent of the state’s budget).
116. Pontiac v. Duncan, 584 F.3d 253, 284 (6th Cir. 2009) (Sutton, J., dissenting).
117. See supra Part I.
118. See Whitman v. American Trucking Assn., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (holding that Congress must
articulate an intelligible principle to guide enforcement of a law when delegating lawmaking authority to
executive agencies).
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that the curricular and testing requirements under NCLB could have been
predicted by state officials when they initially agreed to take advantage of the
ESEA funds. Finally, while there may be some question of whether or not the
size of the federal grant was as extreme as it was under the ACA, it is certainly
plausible that the grant was large enough to coerce states into accepting it.
IV. PROPOSAL
If NCLB or any similar measure were invalidated due to coercion, what
would the future hold for federal involvement in education reform? The answer
may lie in realizing there are actual federal interests in public education above
and beyond providing for the general welfare.
This section presents an argument that legitimate federal interests in public
education can be found in both the Commerce Clause, controlling interstate
commerce through public education, and in the Due Process Clause, protecting
individual students’ rights.
A. Federal Guarantee of Minimum Educational Outcomes
This proposal calls for the creation of specific and articulated minimum
outcomes for all students. These outcomes should guarantee all Americans have a
basic opportunity to participate in American governance and commerce. This is
not a call for a national curriculum or even a common set of curricular standards,
but a basic floor of skills and understandings that are essential to citizens of the
United States.
1. Educational Outcomes Under Commerce Power
Congress explicitly has the authority to “regulate Commerce . . . among the
119
Several States.” Between the mid-1930s and mid-1990s, the Supreme Court
120
consistently upheld a very broad definition of this power. However, in 1995
121
that trend ebbed somewhat in United States v. Lopez, the first case in over fifty
years that substantially limited the federal government’s Commerce Clause
122
authority. While some commentators suggest Lopez explicitly denies Congress
123
Commerce Clause authority in the field of public education, the ruling is
119. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
120. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 211 (1942) (holding that Congress, under the Commerce
Clause, could regulate the growth of wheat for personal consumption).
121. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
122. Id.
123. Nicole Liguori, Leaving No Child Behind (Except in States That Don’t Do What We Say):
Connecticut’s Challenge to the Federal Government’s Power to Control State Education Policy Through the
Spending Clause, 47 B.C. L. REV. 1033, 1072 n.263 (2006).
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considerably narrower in scope. Lopez does not deny that there may be some
Commerce Clause authority over education, moreover it actually lays out a test
that seems to expressly allow Congress some control—just not the control it was
exerting in Lopez.
Lopez ruled a provision of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990
124
unconstitutional due to lack of congressional authority. The Gun-Free School
Zones Act made it a federal offense to knowingly possess a firearm in a school
125
zone. In dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by three other justices, justified
Congresses’ Commerce Clause authority by finding an impact on interstate
commerce: firearms in schools could lead to an increase in school violence; an
increase in school violence could lead to an inferior educational experience; and
an inferior educational experience could lead to a decrease in potential workforce
126
127
capabilities. While the majority believed this connection was too attenuated,
they did admit, “[w]e do not doubt that Congress has authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate numerous commercial activities that substantially
128
affect interstate commerce and also affect the educational process.” Thus,
Lopez does not stand for a blanket rejection of federal power over education; it
simply finds this particular attempt too attenuated. Moreover, in a concurring
opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, articulated his concern
129
that the federal law proscribes the method of enforcement.
While it is doubtful that any State, or indeed any reasonable person, would
argue that it is a wise policy to allow students to carry guns on school premises,
considerable disagreement exists about how best to accomplish that goal. In this
circumstance, the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States
may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various
130
collations where the best solution is far from clear.
Justice Kennedy’s concerns stem from the notion that Congress is telling the
states how to solve a problem, not that they are telling the states that they must
131
solve a problem.
2. Distinguishing Lopez
In Lopez, the Court identified the three categories of activity that Congress
132
has the authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause. Congress has the
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Lopez, 513 U.S. at 551.
Id.
Id. at 619–20. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 565.
Id. at 565–66.
Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 558.
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authority to regulate the use of channels of interstate commerce; the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
133
commerce; and activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. The
establishment of a minimum educational guarantee reasonably falls into both the
first and third of these categories.
Identifying a minimum educational guarantee is closely tied to the notion that
school children are likely to become employed in some field that engages in
interstate commerce. Therefore, the schools, at least to the extent that they are
preparing students for the workplace, are channels of interstate commerce. While
the Supreme Court has not addressed this notion directly, it emerges by
connecting two ideas.
134
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the majority opinion analogized compulsory
education laws to child labor laws: “The two kinds of statutes—compulsory
school attendance and child labor laws—tend to keep children of certain ages off
the labor market and in school; this regimen in turn provides opportunity to
prepare for a livelihood of a higher order than that which children could pursue
135
without education and protects their health in adolescence.” While this
Comment calls for a minimal educational guarantee rather than a federal
compulsory education law, the connection between the two is obvious: the only
justification for a compulsory education law is that it provides some form of
minimal education for children.
In United States v. Darby Lumber Company, the Court ruled that, among
136
other workplace requirements, federal child labor laws were constitutional. The
rationale that the Court relied on was, in part, that these laws forbade companies
from using injurious practices upon the citizens of one state in order to keep
137
prices down, thereby creating an unfair business advantage over other states.
Lawrence Tribe expands upon this argument:
Plainly, Darby’s concept of what might make an object’s use in the state
of destination ‘injurious to the public health, moral, or welfare’ is broad
enough to encompass a ‘moral injury’ of creating a market for,
encouraging, or simply exploiting the fruits of, practices tolerated by the
state of origin, and perhaps by the state of destination, but not by the
138
nation at large.
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If Congress has Commerce Clause authority to forbid child labor (Darby), it
should have a similar control over child labor’s conceptual antecedent,
compulsory education, and, by proxy, minimal educational outcomes.
The policy in both cases is the same. One reason states would choose to
allow child labor is to keep labor prices low and give companies within their
139
borders a competitive advantage. States (or districts) could have the same
motivation to keep educational standards artificially low. Their citizens would
not be competitive in a job market outside the state (or district) and would
consequently lower the local cost of labor and give companies in that region a
competitive advantage.
The creation of federal minimum education standards would also fall within
the commerce power of Congress under the third prong of the Lopez Test:
140
“activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” In Morrison, the
Court identified four factors it uses to determine whether an activity substantially
141
affects interstate commerce.
Two of the factors are procedural in function. The statute must have an
“express jurisdictional element, that is, a clear statement of the rationale
142
Congress is using in applying the Commerce Clause to the given statute. This
element is met simply enough during the drafting of new legislation by including
a statement of legislative intent that addresses the statute’s nexus to the
Commerce Clause.
The other “procedural” element is that there must be congressional findings
143
that suggest there is an effect on interstate commerce. To meet this element,
Congress would need to demonstrate that a failure to ensure that all children have
basic educational competency has a deleterious effect on interstate commerce.
This could be demonstrated by a showing that lower educational attainment leads
to a difference in worker productivity or market value. Congress could also factor
in the costs of retraining employees in the workforce to meet the basic
competencies that could or should be assured by the public education system.
The other two factors to be considered are more substantive in nature. First,
the court must determine whether the activity being controlled is some sort of
144
economic endeavor. The definition of an economic endeavor has historically
145
included activities that are traditionally done for money. In Wickard v. Filburn,
the Court ruled that even grain cultivated for personal use could be controlled
under the Commerce Clause because it had the potential to impact traditional
139. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 115 (explaining that the purpose of the Act was to prevent states from using
substandard labor conditions to gain a competitive advantage in the interstate marketplace.”).
140. United States v. Lopez, 513 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
141. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 596, 610–12 (2000).
142. Id. at 611–12.
143. Id. at 612.
144. Id. at 610.
145. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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146

commercial agriculture.. Under this broad definition, the answer seems clear:
education is something traditionally done for money. The first schools in the
country were private and parents still spend over $40 billion on private schools
147
today. The fact that the government subsidizes local public schools with tax
dollars does not make them any less an economic endeavor. Moreover, unlike
148
Lopez, which dealt with a criminal statute, this proposal calls for a qualitycontrol statute in an economic arena.
The second substantive factor is the degree to which the effect of the
149
proposed law on interstate commerce is direct or attenuated. This Comment
proposes legislation that directly impacts interstate commerce in that it would
normalize a minimum level of output across states and would forbid states (or
districts) to undercut each other in a race to the bottom. Unlike Lopez, where a
150
series of assumptions are necessary in order to find an effect, the effect here is
clear: states need to assure that all students are prepared to be competitive in
interstate commerce.
Under this analysis, the extent to which a federal statute can control
minimum educational opportunities for students is limited. Federal outcomes
must be minimum guarantees, not standards for all states, districts, schools, or
children. Clearly the scope of these outcomes would be very contentious and,
consequently, would need to be removed from a partisan process as far as
possible. These guarantees should be established by a national, bipartisan
consortium of higher education and business interests and should be aimed at a
level which would provide all young people with a competitive opportunity for
college admittance or a career. The dangers lie in setting these outcomes too
high, making them impossible to meet, or making them too low, effectively
rendering them moot.
3. Minimum Educational Outcomes Are a Fundamental Right
Beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska in 1923, the Court has addressed the
151
question of whether education is a fundamental right. However, it has yet to
answer the question directly. If Congress identified a minimum level of education
as a fundamental right, it could trigger the first case in which the Court was
forced to decide this matter directly. This section will suggest that minimum

146. Id.
147. K–12 Facts, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM (Jan. 11, 2014, 5:20 PM), http://www.edreform.com/
2012/04/k-12-facts (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
148. United States v. Lopez, 513 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
149. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
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151. 269 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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educational outcomes are within the “penumbras” and “emanations” of explicit
constitutional guarantees and should be protected under the Due Process Clause.
The major focus of Supreme Court decisions involving education and the
Due Process Clause has been protecting parents, teachers, and sometimes
153
students from the state implementing laws limiting educational opportunities.
In Meyer, the court ruled that a state statute forbidding the teaching of a
foreign language to students not yet fluent in English was a violation of the Due
154
Process Clause. While this case turned on the teacher’s right to teach and the
155
parent’s right to allow the child to be taught, in a broad pronouncement, Justice
McReynolds suggested that liberty “denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint, but also the right of the individual . . . to engage in any of the common
156
occupations of life, [and] to acquire useful knowledge.” He goes on to say
“[t]he American people have always regarded education and acquisition of
157
knowledge as matters of supreme importance.” This central idea was reinforced
in 1968, in Epperson v. Arkansas, declaring unconstitutional a statute that
158
forbade the teaching of evolution.
Parents’ rights to hold some degree of control over their child’s education
159
has also been identified as a fundamental right. Moreover, school children have
160
been given individual protection under both the Equal Protection Clause and
161
the Due Process Clause. In fact, in Brown v. Board of Education, Chief Justice
Warren seems to suggest that there is something about public education that
makes it a particularly protected institution for civil rights: “We conclude that in
162
the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”
While the Court in Brown avoided the due process question, this pronouncement
certainly seems to demonstrate the Court was placing public education in a
protected realm of its own.

152. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
153. See generally Meyer, 269 U.S. at 400 (holding a teacher has the right to teach German to a child not
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school instead of public school); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (holding a science teacher has
the right to teach evolution).
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158. 393 U.S. at 107.
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Many commentators point to San Antonio Independent School District v.
163
Rodriguez (San Antonio) as definitively rejecting a fundamental right to a
164
public education: “Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded
explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for
165
saying it is implicitly so protected.” While this pronouncement seems, initially,
rather conclusive, it must be understood in context.
First of all, San Antonio was an equal protection case, not a due process case;
166
consequently the discussion of due process is not controlling. School children
in San Antonio, Texas had sued the State claiming its school-funding
167
mechanisms favored wealthier families. The Court reasoned that the decision in
Brown was not so broad as to guarantee that every student be funded at exactly
168
the same level.
Additionally, the majority later wrote: “Even if it were conceded that some
identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to
the meaningful exercise of [other constitutional] right[s], we have no indication
that the present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an education
169
that falls short [of providing the necessary minimal skills].”
Some lower courts have since expounded upon this view. In Fialkowski v.
Shapp, the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania distinguished the case at bar
from San Antonio by saying that, in San Antonio, “the Court held that when a
state educational system affords minimally adequate educational opportunities to
all children, that some children are afforded greater opportunities than others
170
does not amount to a denial of equal protection.” In Valdez v. Graham, the
Middle District of Florida distinguished its case from San Antonio by saying:
“that decision dealt with a claimed equal protection violation and, thus, is not
171
controlling on a due process claim.”
Even the Supreme Court has appeared uncomfortable in determining that the
decision in San Antonio forbade the federal government from setting the level of
education the Constitution guarantees: “Public education is not a ‘right’ granted
to individuals by the Constitution. But neither is it merely some governmental
‘benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation . . . In
172
sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.”
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Moreover, even the most recent decisions on this issue came more than thirty
173
years ago. In that time, the field of education and the international economy
have shifted to such a great extent that the Court could rule that, in our modern
economy, a minimum educational guarantee is absolutely a fundamental right. As
laid out in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, one legitimate reason for overruling a
previous decision is a change in facts that renders the previous decision
174
obsolete. The vast changes in public education and the global economy since
San Antonio was decided in 1973 suggest the “identifiable quantum of
education” may have grown large enough to warrant specific constitutional
protection.
The key to creating a federally guaranteed minimum level of education is
keeping it specific enough that it can be considered “some identifiable quantum
of education [that] is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful
175
exercise of [the right to free speech or the right to vote].” While this would
certainly be a contentious determination, it seems clear that it would include
basic reading and writing skills, fundamental mathematics, some civics and
history, and potentially some science. A nonpartisan group would need to draft
these outcomes, being sure to draw the standards around preparing a child to
speak, write, and vote—but not what to say or how to vote.
4. Limited Spending Power Authority
While this Comment does call for the dismantling of most of NCLB and a
shift of focus from Spending Clause authority to Commerce and Due Process
Clause authority, it does not suggest that the federal government completely
abolish all spending programs. Rather, spending programs must be adjusted to
176
meet the requirements laid out in Pennhurst. They should be optional, specific,
177
limited in scope, and unambiguous. While the call for federal guarantees
eliminates the need for many of the proposals under NCLB and discretionary
block grant funding, Spending Clause power is still appropriate for what has
historically been considered categorical funding.
Furthermore, states could not shoulder the burden of a complete loss of
federal funding. This proposal calls for little actual reduction in state funding.
Instead, it calls for a return to the process of earmarking federal funds for specific
programs schools may accept or decline without any effect on which other funds
may be available. The federal government could reduce some costs by reducing
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certain monitoring expenses, but the remainder of spending should remain at the
same level. The government should break spending down into programs that
states or districts know how to accept.
B. A Civil Rights Remedy
Any right to a minimum education prescribed by Congress must have an
accompanying remedy in order to be meaningful. The creation of a federal statute
guaranteeing a minimum education to all children should explicitly contain
language articulating that a violation of this right could result in a civil action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an individual has a federal claim against any
“person” who violates his civil rights while acting in an official capacity and
178
under color of state law.
Courts have interpreted person to include
179
governmental bodies where appropriate. Case law indicates that in order to
180
bring a claim, section 1983 must specifically protect the right in question.
In this context, a section 1983 claim would arise when a school, district, or
state, by means of official policy or procedures, fails to provide a student with the
specific educational outcomes guaranteed by the statute.
The remedy in these actions could parallel existing federal remedies for
students whose rights have been violated in other ways. For example, the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) already entitles students who
suffer from specific learning disabilities to reimbursement for a private school
181
education if there is a material breach of his or her learning plan.
A similar remedy for a violation of this proposed statute would be
appropriate. If a student can show that certain fundamental outcomes have not
been effectively met by a certain age, the state, district, or school could be
required to provide additional services on site, require the student to repeat a
grade or enter a targeted intervention program, or pay for private school tuition.
C. Expected Challenges with a Civil Rights Proposal
The proposal to replace the bulk of NCLB with a federally guaranteed
minimum education and a section 1983 remedy is fraught with political and
policy concerns above and beyond the constitutional concerns already discussed.
Among these are claims of immunity, the possibility of inviting enormous
amounts of litigation, and the argument that a federal guarantee is a “power grab”
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that violates the traditional relationship between state and federal governments.
Proper drafting could mitigate each of these concerns.
1. School Districts Are Not Immune From Federal Suits
The Eleventh Amendment generally provides states with immunity from federal
182
183
suits. This immunity, however, does not apply to school districts. Consequently,
there would be no constitutional bar preventing individuals from suing the school
district (or districts) they attended in a section 1983 action.
2. There Will Not Be Crushing Liability
There is an enormous public policy concern that a statute of this sort would
encourage massive amounts of both frivolous and justified litigation against school
districts that are already strapped for cash. Language regarding the minimum
outcomes would need to be clear, specific, and concrete—leaving very little room for
judicial interpretation.
Moreover, the threat of litigation would likely be exactly the “stick” needed to
encourage school districts to create appropriate intervention, monitoring, and support
strategies in order to best support students.
Lastly, limiting the statue to equitable, rather than legal, remedies would prevent
students or parents from using the statute as an avenue to “get rich quick.”
3. Overcoming Political Resistance
In addition to these concerns, there would be considerable political resistance to
the implementation of federal guarantees. Contemporary rhetoric regarding the
“common core standards” is a likely prelude to the interests of the major players in
184
this debate. To assuage concerns, it is essential that the statute contain clear
language as to the functions of these guaranteed minimums. A recent study suggests
a significant majority of both Democrats and Republicans support an intra-state set of
185
standards as long as they are not called “the Common Core” standards.
The first concern would be that by declaring guaranteed federal outcomes,
Congress may be “dumbing down” more strenuous local and state standards. It is
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imperative, in this regard, to stress that the constitutional guarantees are a floor
and not a ceiling. States, districts, and schools should be encouraged to develop
their own standards that build off of the federal guarantees and tailor them more
closely to the specific needs of their communities.
Other contingents would argue that the school teacher, not the federal
government, is in the best position to determine how to teach students. This
statute must reflect that concern and make it clear that this is not the creation of a
federal curriculum. Nothing in the language of the statute should suggest how the
guarantees are to be taught or assessed. In fact, the statute should specifically
state that the manner in which the guarantees are delivered is the province of the
states, districts, schools, and teachers to determine.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to comply with contemporary constitutional understandings, the role
of the federal government in public education must be profoundly changed.
While some specific, narrowly tailored spending programs are both appropriate
and essential, massive federal oversight, masked in the cloak of optional funding
programs, must be reined in. Instead, Congress should articulate a base set of
constitutionally protected educational guarantees for all students, giving the
states, districts, and schools the authority to meet those guarantees in the way
they find most appropriate. Congress can aid the states in accomplishing these
goals with specific funding for particularly difficult or expensive programs, but
the manner in which these funds are used should be reserved to the states.
Through this proposal, we can guarantee the right to a basic education in a
constitutional, pedagogically appropriate manner.
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